Ocsp.pki.goog and associated malware

The below urls and constituent serving ip’s come up a fair amount in company iPhones. The UTF-8 hashes correspond to “some” application or octet stream, but, while the URL’s themselves scan somewhat clean, apart from invalid certificates and lousy Whois info, the serving up addresses are loaded with malicious communicating files, many of which reference these same url/filehash/ GET requests.


if anyone has any pertinent info, it would be welcomed, many of the files I’ve found are communicating directly with 17. Addresses.


Reference: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/23.64.114.214/summary


Link to file hosting

Arcsight flags this url as suspicious.


Reference: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/173.194.196.94/summary


Link to file hosting

scans clean, but then… the ip address….


Reference: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/72.21.91.29/summary


Link to file hosting

Xictium and one other vendor flag this url as malicious and the serving IP is trash.


So, malicious GET requests, coming in on seemingly legitimate domains, are passing the censor, so to speak. How to keep this evil at bay? About 6 apps are regularly communicating with these addresses, and since Apple, in all their wisdom, (geniuses…..) has seen fit to obfusticate time and dates that apps are contacting these domains, it makes it nearly impossible for the end user to actually solve. So, what do?

vpn? No good, tried several, this exploit seems to evade due to the legitimacy of the initial domain.

blacklist? No good, file hashes change regularly to the tune of over 100 in the last few months.

Reference: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/650b22b488fd536495791218

scanning apps? Not detecting these requests as malicious, avast, avg, Norton, cannot block all these requests and “some” Ocsp.pki.goog requests are actually necessary for app and iPhone function. Though nearly all of the ones I’m seeing in the above pulse are pure evil.

I’m out of answers and my crystal ball is in the witch-store getting a new djinn.


[Edited by Moderator]

iPhone 11

Posted on Dec 14, 2023 11:48 PM

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5 replies

Dec 15, 2023 12:52 AM in response to reeder275

iOS / iPadOS devices cannot be infected** with Viruses / Malware / Spyware unless you have intentionally downloaded spurious software or unauthorized apps directly from the internet and installed them on your device or/and have Jailbroken



**The primary reason for this is Sandboxing. All third-party apps are “sandboxed”, so they are restricted from accessing files stored by other apps or from making changes to the device. Sandboxing is designed to prevent apps from gathering or modifying information stored by other apps.


Security of runtime process in iOS and iPadOS - Apple Support



The sandbox on an iPhone is a security feature that creates a restricted environment for each app to run in isolation from other apps and the operating system. It is a core component of iOS's security architecture and plays a crucial role in making iPhones more secure.


In layman's terms:


The sandbox works by enforcing strict controls and limitations on app behavior, ensuring that each app has access only to the resources it needs to function properly. Here are some key aspects of the sandbox that contribute to iPhone security:


  1. Isolation: Each app on an iPhone operates within its own sandboxed environment, which means it has no direct access to the files, processes, or memory of other apps. This isolation prevents apps from interfering with one another, protecting user data and maintaining system stability.
  2. Restricted Resource Access: The sandbox restricts an app's access to sensitive resources such as contacts, photos, location data, and system settings. Apps must explicitly request user permission to access these resources, and users have control over granting or denying access. This helps prevent unauthorized data access and ensures user privacy.
  3. Limited File System Access: Apps can only access their own containerized storage area and specific system-provided directories. They cannot modify files outside of their designated areas or interfere with the operating system files. This prevents apps from tampering with critical system components.
  4. Code Execution Controls: The sandbox enforces restrictions on code execution, preventing apps from running arbitrary code or injecting malicious code into other apps or the system. It helps ensure that apps only execute approved code from their own sandboxed environment.
  5. App Review Process: Before an app is allowed on the App Store, it goes through a rigorous review process conducted by Apple. This review examines the app's functionality, security, and adherence to guidelines. It helps detect and remove malicious or poorly designed apps, minimizing the risk to users.


The combination of these sandboxing mechanisms helps create a secure environment on iPhones, protecting user data, maintaining system integrity, and preventing unauthorized access or interference between apps.



Dec 15, 2023 03:18 PM in response to SravanKrA

This doesn’t help this particular issue. I did not state that my phone was “infected”, I did not state that I did not understand sandboxing. In fact, If you had bothered to check my reference links, you’d have understood that I understand, and am utilizing multiple sandboxes via VirusTotal, in order to understand and back up my claims. It is these very sandboxes that are delivering the information that I speak of, i.e. “malicious files that are contacting and referencing 17.xxx IP addresses.”

May 17, 2024 08:39 PM in response to reeder275

As sited on reddit:



what is domain ocsp.pki.goog 



Hi

I recently running SIMBA JDBC BigQuery Driver inside GKE Private Cluster and came to see an error saying  http://ocsp.pki.goog is not reachable. Upon seeing JAVA options we found ssl.revocation option was set to true meaning it was trying to check BQ cert revocation check also called OCSP and because route to this domain was blocked we got error.

This made be think that is any call to google api from GCLOUD and Client libraries does this check behind the scene as i never knew about check though we use lot of BQ connections from Python Client Lib and using GCLOUD. This is the first time i came to know this error from GKE private cluster.


n general, any software that connects to a TLS endpoint should (although, may not [1]) verify the validity of a certificate by checking OCSP or CRL status. These are additional checks to ensure certificates are not only valid and chain up to a trusted root, but that they haven't been revoked and can be trusted. Certificate Authorities will revoke certificates if they believe there is a good reason, such as in a key compromise, or duringroutine key rotation. If your TLS client is unable to validate the CRL or OCSP status of a certificate, it may decide to "fail open" and continue, or "fail close" and not allow the connection, which could lead to all kinds of unusual problems. It's best to make sure the CRL and OCSP network connections can be made to work (i.e. DNS lookups are allowed and network firewalls allow the connection) or disable the revocation checking all together if that isn't possible.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#appendix-C.2


Though I wouldn't go out of my way to click on anything these guys offer up. <3 These are my hackers

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Ocsp.pki.goog and associated malware

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